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Abstract—This paper describes and analyzes the Greek Capacity 
Market or, as named, the “Capacity Adequacy Mechanism”. A 
detailed description of the recently established mechanism is 
given, whose design is a hybrid model combining elements from 
three different designs: the US Capacity Markets, the Capacity 
Payment Mechanisms and the Centralized Auctions for Capacity 
Contracts. Next, the goals of this design are explained. In the case 
of Greece the goals are not restricted just to the so-called 
“missing money” problem, therefore an analysis follows 
examining the incentives given to the market participants. The 
analysis shows the dependence of the mechanism on mainly two 
factors: the over/under-capacity of the market and the strategic 
behavior of the market participants, especially of the incumbent. 
In general, the Capacity Adequacy Mechanism is expected to 
operate quite satisfactory, giving the “right” incentives to the 
market participants. Some minor amendments to the rules are 
proposed, aiming to further increase its efficiency. 
Keywords—Capacity Mechanisms, Electricity Markets, 
Mechanism Design, Strategic Behavior.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
REECE has been going through a phase of lack of 
investments in electricity generation capacity for almost a 
decade. The continuously growing demand in electricity and 
the disproportionally smaller number of investments in new 
generation plants has significantly reduced the generation 
capacity reserve margin. The need for an electricity market 
design that would give incentives to new independent power 
producers to enter the market was always one of the top 
priorities of the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE). It 
became one of the main topics of the reforms discussed from 
2003 to 2005, during the process of redesigning the initial 
electricity market framework of 2001. 
The new Grid and Market Operation Code [1] provides for 
the development of a centrally organized daily wholesale 
market and the introduction of a capacity mechanism. More 
details regarding the Greek electricity market and its design 
can be found in [1]-[5]. 
Capacity mechanisms are an important supplement to the 
wholesale electricity markets, as they provide incentives to 
new generators to come on-line by guaranteeing them an 
additional income, ideally enough to cover the so-called 
“missing money problem”. The capacity mechanisms are 
mainly of two types, capacity payments and capacity markets, 
although lately there is a rising support for the centralized 
auctions for forward capacity/reliability contracts [6-7].  
Moreover, capacity mechanisms tend to differ among each 
other, as they are appropriately customized to address the 
problem of investments in the specific context of each market, 
characterized by its design, structure and particularities. It 
should come then as no surprise that the Greek Capacity 
Adequacy Mechanism (CAM), although belonging to the 
capacity market type, combines elements from all mechanism 
types, bringing forth a new capacity mechanism design.  
This paper has two parts. The first part (corresponding to 
Section II) presents in detail the novel design of the Greek 
Capacity Market. The second part (Sections III and IV) 
proceeds a step further, shedding light on the expected 
strategic behavior of the market participants and showing its 
dependence on the generation adequacy level of the market. 
Finally, based on the analysis of both parts, the main 
weaknesses of the mechanism are identified and some 
proposals are offered to counter them. 
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE CAPACITY ADEQUACY MECHANISM 
A. The Capacity Adequacy Mechanism Design 
The Capacity Adequacy Mechanism aims to ensure long-
term capacity availability and is based on the obligation of the 
suppliers to present sufficient guarantees in this direction. Its 
design is similar to the one of the Northeast US capacity 
markets (PJM, NYISO, ISO-NE), adapted appropriately to the 
structure and characteristics of the Greek electricity market.  
Each supplier, self-supplying customer and exporter (hereon 
“load representatives”) is assigned a Capacity Adequacy 
Obligation, which is measured in units of MW-Available 
Capacity and is calculated for every Reliability Year (October 
1st – September 30th) according to the energy consumed1 by 
each load representative during the periods of increased 
probability of loss of load, as calculated by the System 
Operator (SO)2. The calculation of the Obligations takes into 
consideration the required capacity reserve margin, determined 
 
1
 CAM includes both an ex-ante and an ex-post calculation of the 
Obligations. The final settlement is based on the ex-post Obligations. As this 
complexity exceeds the scope of this paper, details regarding the settlement 
process of the CAM were deliberately left out. 
2
 These periods are determined according to a formula described in [1] and 
correspond to the hours with the lowest reserve availability. 
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yearly by the Minister of Development, based on RAE’s 
opinion following a recommendation by the SO. 
Furthermore, each producer issues, for each of his units and 
for the next five Reliability Years, Capacity Availability 
Tickets, each Ticket being valid for one Reliability Year. The 
total number of Tickets issued for each unit equals its net 
capacity. Every Reliability Year the SO estimates the available 
capacity (UCAP) of each unit, based on the Demand 
Equivalent Forced Outage Rate of the unit (EFORd), and 
allocates it equivalently among its Tickets. Thus, every Ticket 
has an available capacity value equal to ( )EFORd−1 .  
The Tickets constitute a call to load representatives for the 
conclusion of Capacity Availability Contracts. Each Contract 
has an available capacity value equal to the one of its 
underlying Ticket. The conclusion of a Contract implies the 
existence of a price for available capacity, set privately 
between the two counterparties. Moreover the two 
counterparties are encouraged to sign, independently of the 
CAM, bilateral financial agreements in the form of Contracts 
for Differences (CfDs) or Call Options.  
The Code provides that Obligations can only be covered 
through the conclusion of Contracts between the load 
representatives and the producers. The load representatives 
must submit to the SO Contracts with a total available capacity 
value equal to their Obligations.  
The above description of the CAM is presented in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1.   The Capacity Adequacy Mechanism Design 
In case a load representative does not cover all of its 
Obligations, he is charged with the Non Compliance Penalty 
for the part of his Obligations not covered by Contracts. Thus 
the Penalty defines in some sense the price cap for available 
capacity. The Penalty value is set by RAE for each Reliability 
Year (currently equal to 35,000 €/MW-Available Capacity), 
considering amongst other factors the capacity reserve margin 
and the cost of adding new generation capacity to the Greek 
electricity system.  
The Penalty value calculation methodology is currently 
under review, in order to promote a more transparent one, 
directly linking the Penalty value to the generation adequacy 
level, thus giving better economic signals to the market. The 
concept of the new methodology, first presented by Caramanis 
[8], is based on the construction of a kinked curve, matching 
each (system-wide) available capacity level to a specific value. 
The Penalty value for each Reliability Year is then determined 
by the value of the kinked curve at the total available capacity 
valid for that Reliability Year. An example of this curve is 
presented in Fig. 2.  
 
Fig. 2.  The Non Compliance Penalty Curve 
Finally, as a safeguard measure, the SO can conduct tenders 
for the pre-purchase of Contracts, corresponding to new units, 
when a danger for capacity shortage is foreseen. The pre-
purchase provides the minimum required security for the 
income of the new units, thus facilitating their financing, and 
takes the form of a “Financial Contract of Guaranteed 
Revenues” (similar to a call option on the generator’s 
revenues). This pre-purchase assumes that the investor takes 
the full business risk regarding the equity and commits to the 
prompt construction of the unit, its smooth operation and 
maintaining it to its full capacity availability. The SO recovers 
every cost resulting from the contract, with these costs being 
distributed to the load representatives. 
B. The Transitional Mechanism 
During the Transitional period and due to the difficulty in the 
conclusion of Contracts between load representatives and 
producers, as currently the only load representative - apart 
from some small exporters - is the incumbent, a Regulated 
Mechanism (RM) is also offered to the market participants. 
The producers and the load representatives are given the 
alternative choice to participate in the CAM by concluding 
Contracts with the SO. In this case the producers receive a 
regulated price equal to the Penalty value for the available 
capacity with which they participate in the RM3. This amount, 
 
3
 This is a simplification of the actual rules, but adequate for the overview 
of the RM. There is also an ex-post adjustment to these payments, so that the 
producers will receive them only for the hourly periods that their units were 
declared available in the day ahead market. This adjustment could be 
interpreted as a second derating of the units’ capacity, only now it is just 
considered for the purposes of the SO payments. 
The “double-counting” of the capacity derating in the SO payments may 
seem strange to the reader but there is a justification behind it. If the regulated 
payment was made for all hours of the year, independently of the availability 
of the unit, then no unit would have an incentive to conclude a Contract with 
a load representative, as this would always cost more. This would, in effect, 
cancel the described CAM design. Under the current design, a unit 
participating in the RM will receive the regulated payment, but this will most 
likely be less than the amount received by concluding a Contract with a load 
representative, as shown in Section IV. Moreover this rule gives to the units 
participating in the RM a stronger incentive to be available in the day ahead 
market.  
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equal to the total available capacity participating in the RM 
multiplied by the Penalty value, is covered by the participating 
load representatives in the RM, proportionally to their 
Obligations4. Note that the producers may conclude Contracts 
with the SO for only a part of their Tickets. At the same time, 
the load representatives, if they choose to conclude Contracts 
with the SO, they must do it for all of their Obligations.  
It is also worth noting that, so far, all market participants 
have participated in the CAM only through the RM. Moreover 
the SO has conducted tender for the pre-purchase of Contracts, 
awarding the relative contract to a 440 MW CCGT unit to be 
constructed by 2010. 
C. Goals of the Capacity Adequacy Market Design 
The addition of the RM to the CAM leads to a design where:  
• The main design (hereon “Capacity Market”) is based on 
the capacity market design, introduced to draw sufficient 
investments, solve the “missing money” problem and set 
the base for the conclusion of (long term) financial 
contracts between load representatives and producers. 
• The tenders held by the SO aim to induce investments for 
periods in which a capacity deficit is forecasted. The 
awarded contracts guarantee the minimum revenues of 
the new generator(s) for 12 years and at the same time 
they set a cap to the bids of the generator, reducing the 
volatility of prices in the market. Thus, many of the 
benefits of the Centralized Auction design are gained, 
creating a more secure and less risky environment for 
investments and entry of new players, both in generation 
as in retail. 
• In order to face the current immaturity of the market, 
where no load representatives apart from the incumbent 
exist, the RM is introduced, having a lot of similarities 
with various capacity payment schemes. The RM offers a 
significantly less complex mechanism for new entrants to 
participate into and a certain income for the producers. 
• Finally, the planned introduction of the Non Compliance 
Penalty Curve will link the otherwise independently 
calculated Penalty value to the total available capacity of 
each Reliability Year, creating also an indicative demand 
curve for available capacity in a transparent way. 
The main concerns with the above design have to do with the 
interactions between the Capacity Market and the RM, as well 
as the incentives given to and the anticipated strategic behavior 
by the market participants as explained next. 
III. INCENTIVES GIVEN TO MARKET PARTICIPANTS  
A. Nomenclature and Assumptions 
In this section the profit functions of each market participant 
are analyzed and their best responses are identified. For this 
analysis the following symbols are used:   
j : index of unit  
i : index of load representative 
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 Notice that the load representative payments are not adjusted ex-post, as 
with the producer ones. Therefore there is always a surplus for the SO, equal 
to the ex-post adjustment of the payments to the producers.  
CACP :  the price of available capacity (in €/MW-Available 
Capacity) 
NCPP :     the Penalty value (in €/MW-Available Capacity) 
jUCAP :  the available capacity of unit j  
j
RMUCAP : the available capacity of unit j with which it 
participates in the RM  
j
CACUCAP : the available capacity of unit j with which it 
participates in the Capacity Market  
iCAO :  number of Obligations of load representative i 
RM
CAO :  total number of Obligations covered through RM 
CAC
CAO :  total number of Obligations covered through the 
Capacity Market 
When the indices i or j are omitted then the symbol refers to 
all units.  
It is assumed that a price of available capacity CACP  exists 
and can be observed by all participants. This assumption 
seems reasonable, considering the Greek market structure with 
its small number of players. In reality, Contract prices are not 
observable as they are the result of (private) bargaining 
between producers and load representatives.   
Moreover, it is assumed, without loss of generality, that it 
always holds NCPCAC PP < . 
B. Producer Profits and Participation to CAM 
Each producer has two choices for his Tickets. One choice is 
to conclude a Contract with a load representative, receiving an 
amount equal to the available capacity of the 
Ticket, jEFORd)-(1 , multiplied by the price of available 
capacity CACP , i.e. jCAC EFORd)-(1P ⋅ . 
Alternatively, the producer can conclude a Contract with the 
SO, receiving an amount equal to the available capacity of the 
Ticket multiplied this time by the Penalty value NCPP . Note 
though that he will receive this amount only for the hours that 
his unit is declared available in the day ahead market. Thus, 
this payment needs to be reduced accordingly, i.e. 
( ) available) is junit year  ain  hours of (%EFORd)-(1P jNCP ⋅⋅ . 
For the present analysis the aforementioned percentage will 
be approximated by the units’ EFORd value, as by definition it 
is a measure of the probability that a unit will not be available 
to generate due to forced outages. Thus the producer will 
receive an amount equal to ( )2jNCP EFORd)-(1P ⋅ .  
The producer’s choise regarding whom to conclude the 
Contract with, depends on the relation between CACP  and 
NCPP . More specifically it depends on whether: 
jNCPCAC EFORd)-(1PP ⋅<> . (1) 
C. Load Representative Costs and Participation to CAM 
The choices available to a load representative regarding the 
ways to cover his Obligations are similar to the ones presented 
for the producers.   
More specifically, one choice is to conclude Contracts with 
producers for a part of his Obligations and pay the Penalty for 
the rest. Since it has been assumed that NCPCAC PP < , each load 
representative has an incentive to conclude Contracts with the 
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producers for the total of his Obligations. Then his total cost is 
ii CAOLR ⋅= CACP . 
The other choice a load representative has is to conclude 
Contracts with the SO but pay the corresponding payment only 
if it is less than the Penalty, otherwise he would prefer to 
become deficient and just pay the Penalty for all his 
Obligations. The payment corresponding to the RM is 
determined by allocating the amount5 RMUCAP⋅
NPCP to the 
load representatives participating in the RM, proportionally to 
their Obligations. Then the load representative’s cost is: 
.1,minP
P,Pmin
NPC
NPCNPC






⋅⋅=
=





⋅⋅⋅=
RM
RMi
i
RM
RM
i
i
CAO
UCAPCAO
CAOUCAP
CAO
CAOLR
 (2) 
Therefore, if RMRM CAOUCAP <  the load representative has an 
incentive to conclude Contracts with the SO, otherwise he 
would prefer to pay the Penalty.  
The final choice of the load representative depends on the 
relation between RMUCAP  and RMCAO . More specifically it 
depends on whether:  
.PP NPCCAC
RM
RM
CAO
UCAP
⋅<>  (3) 
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
A. Remarks on the Analysis 
First Remark: Following the analysis in Section III, the load 
representatives will consider participating in the RM only if 
the expected cost of their participation is less than the Penalty 
value, that is if they expect RMRM CAOUCAP < . Therefore the 
equilibrium analysis of this game can be simplified in the 
examination of the two cases RMRM CAOUCAP <  and 
RMRM CAOUCAP ≥  and what these imply regarding the number 
of Contracts to be concluded in the context of the CAM. 
Second Remark: The scope of the analysis in this Section is 
not to fully characterize the equilibria of the game, but to give 
a general description of the respective game, as well as 
insights on the strategic behavior of the market participants 
and its possible results. Full characterization of the equilibria 
would require studying a capacity constrained price 
competition game under uncertainty and asymmetric 
information, which is outside of the scope of this paper.  
Third Remark: It will be assumed that Contracts between the 
producers and the load representatives are concluded before 
the ones concluded in the context of the RM. This hypothesis, 
apart from simplifying the analysis, is based on the provision 
of the Code [1] stating that the deadline for participating in the 
RM ends one month before the start-date of the new Reliability 
Year. Without this assumption the equilibrium would have to 
be studied as a two-stage game, one stage before the RM 
participation deadline and one after.  
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 As discussed in Section IIB, this amount corresponds to the regulated 
price the producers receive by the SO for the available capacity with which 
they participate in the RM. 
Fourth Remark: It can be observed from the results of 
Section III that while the decisions of the producers depend on 
exogenous parameters, the jEFORd  of the units, the decisions 
of the load representatives are based on endogenously defined 
parameters and specifically on the ratio of the total available 
capacity value of the units over the total Obligations of the 
load representatives participating in the RM. Therefore the 
choices of the participants, and especially the ones of the load 
representatives, are affected by the strategic behavior of the 
other participants. 
Fifth Remark: As NCPCAC PP < , the load representatives have 
no incentive to pay the Penalty. Therefore their choices will be 
restricted between concluding Contracts with the producers or 
with the SO.  
The only case this might not hold would be if the load 
representatives have more uncovered Obligations than the 
available Tickets. But then, a load representative preferring to 
pay the Penalty instead of participating in the RM means that 
he prefers paying the whole Penalty value instead of just a 
fraction of it, which is an irrational behavior.  
Consequently, the following relations will always hold: 
CAOCAOCAO
CACRM
=+     (4) 
jj
CAC
j
RM
UCAPUCAPUCAP =+ . (5) 
Sixth Remark: CAOUCAPCAOUCAP RMRM ≥⇔≥  as each 
Contract matches on a one-to-one basis the available capacity 
value of a unit to an equal value of Obligations, i.e.  
CACCAC CAOUCAP = . 
Seventh Remark: It has been assumed that the producers 
make the same choice for all of their Tickets, either 
participating in the RM or in the Capacity Market. An 
interesting extension would be to relax this assumption.  
B. Case CAOUCAP ≥   
In this case no load representative has a reason to conclude 
Contracts with the SO, thus 0=RMCAO . They instead prefer 
to conclude Contracts with the producers. The producers will 
try to conclude Contracts with the load representatives at the 
highest possible available capacity price. 
In the equilibrium, the price associated with each Contract 
will be unit specific and may range from NCPP   to zero. This  
mainly depends on the number of Tickets and Obligations of 
each participant, as well as on the existing market structure in 
general6. If on the other hand there was perfect competition, 
with no strategic behavior among the participants, the 
existence of overcapacity would lead to zero prices. 
After all Contracts have been concluded, part of the available 
capacity (equal to CAOUCAP − ), will not be matched to 
Obligations through Contracts. As no load representative will 
participate in the RM, the producers who have not concluded a 
Contract for their available capacity will not receive any 
payment7. 
 
6
 See also the Second Remark. 
7
 It should be noted that in order for the units participating in the RM to 
receive their payments there must also be at least one load representative 
participating in the RM. If this does not happen, the RM mechanism is not 
activated for that Reliability Year. The above rule gives incentive to the 
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C. Case CAOUCAP <  
In this case, each producer, knowing that the demand for 
available capacity is larger than UCAP , has no reason to 
conclude a Contract with a price smaller than the payment he 
expects to receive from the RM. Therefore in this case: 
jNCPCACNCP EFORd)-(1PPP ⋅>> . (7) 
This way an increasing offer curve is created, with the units 
having a lower available capacity value requesting a smaller 
price CACP  in order to conclude Contracts with the load 
representatives. 
On the other hand, the load representatives know that the 
maximum price they are going to have to pay is 
RM
RM
CAO
UCAP⋅NCPP , corresponding to the payment when all 
load  representatives participate in the RM8. 
Since CAOUCAP < , the more available capacity is taken 
off the market (through the conclusion of Contracts in the 
context of the Capacity Market), the lower the cost of the load 
representatives in the context of RM is going to be. This can 
be easily seen if we assume that the participants conclude 
Contracts with value x  of available capacity. Then, the RM 
factor, 
RM
RM
CAO
UCAP
, determining the payment of the load 
representatives is: 
yUCAP
CAO
y
UCAP
x
UCAP
CAO
UCAP
x
xCAO
xUCAP
CAO
UCAP
RM
RM
−
−
=
−
−
=
−
−
=
11
 (8) 
with 1≤= UCAP
xy .  
The RM factor is decreasing in x , as seen in Fig. 3.  
 
Fig. 3.  Graph of the RM factor for CAO/UCAP=1.1 
Following the above, Contracts will be concluded between 
unit j and a load representative only if:  
jNCPCACNCP EFORd)-(1P PP ⋅>>⋅
RM
RM
CAO
UCAP
. (9) 
Equation (9) is well defined when: 
jEFORd)-(1>
RM
RM
CAO
UCAP
 .  (10) 
                                                                                                     
producers to compete for the conclusion of Contracts, leading to prices even 
lower than jNCP EFORd)-(1P ⋅ , which would be the expected income of the 
producers if they participated in the RM. Note also that the load 
representatives always have an incentive to conclude Contracts with the units, 
as otherwise they will be charged with the Penalty. 
8
 Notice that this payment is inversely related with RMCAO . Thus the 
more load representatives participate in the RM the less this amount becomes. 
If (10) does not hold, the optimal strategy for either the 
producers or the load representatives is to conclude Contracts 
only with the SO. Then, unavoidably, all players will 
participate only in the RM.  
If the differences between the quality of the Tickets of the 
various units are ignored9 as well as the possible strategic 
behavior on behalf of the market participants, the number of 
Contracts expected to be concluded between load 
representatives and producers will result from the intersection 
of the unit availability offer curve and 
xCAO
xUCAP
−
−
, as shown in 
Fig. 4. The unit availability offer curve refers to the curve 
resulting from the ordering the available capacity values of all 
Tickets in an increasing order. 
 
Fig. 4.  Number of Contracts to be concluded in Case (C) for 
CAO/UCAP=1.1 and a random unit availability offer curve 
Assuming that the availability offer curve can be 
approximated by a linear function bxaxf +=)( , then the 
optimal (in the sense of maximizing social surplus) number of 
Contracts x  to be concluded results from solving the equation 
xCAO
xUCAPbx
−
−
=+a . 
D. Summary of Results 
If CAOUCAP ≥ , the RM will not be activated, as no 
participant will conclude Contracts with the SO. All the load 
representatives will try to conclude Contracts with the 
producers, although the equilibrium depends greatly on the 
exact parameterization of the game, especially regarding the 
market structure and the individual number of Tickets and 
Obligations of the market participants.  
If CAOUCAP < , the participants will try to estimate RM 
factor and then conclude Contracts based on that. Units whose 
jEFORd)-(1  is larger than the RM factor will have to 
 
9
 This is a very strong simplification. The quality of the Contracts is a crucial 
parameter in the market we examine, but a more complicated analysis would 
be required to address this issue. For example a unit with a low available 
capacity price, but also low availability value, is more likely to have a major 
outage. In the case of a major unforced outage the Contracts are suspended 
and the load representative will have to find new Contracts to cover his 
Obligations. On the contrary, if this unit participated in the RM, the outage of 
the unit wouldn’t only affect the coverage of the Obligations of the load 
representatives, but would also reduce the cost of the load representatives (as 
the unit wouldn’t receive a payment for the corresponding interval).  
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participate in the RM, otherwise they will prefer to conclude 
Contracts with the load representatives at prices satisfying 
equation (9). This will also be the case for the load 
representatives in order to conclude Contracts with producers, 
otherwise they will prefer to participate in the RM. As above, 
the equilibrium will depend on the parameterization of the 
game. 
The above results show the dependence of the mechanism on 
mainly two factors: the over/under-capacity of the market and 
the strategic behavior of the market participants, depending 
mainly on the number of Tickets and Obligations of each 
participant and the existing market structure. Especially in the 
case of Greece, the mechanism is highly dependent on the 
actions of the incumbent, as it has a share of 99,5% in retail 
and about 95% in supply.   
E. Regulatory Remedies 
The Capacity Adequacy Mechanism, in general, can operate 
satisfactorily, giving the “right” incentives to the participants 
depending on the capacity adequacy level of the market. 
Moreover, the Capacity Market and RM supplement one 
another, without having any observable conflicts. The main 
weaknesses of the CAM design appear to be the following: 
i. The market power of the incumbent is not addressed. 
The rest of the participants are highly dependent on his 
choice regarding which mechanism he will participate 
in, although they are not expected to know this 
information till right after the expiration of the deadline 
for participating in the RM. 
ii. The generators have a very strong incentive to be 
always available. The incentive is so strong, that even 
when they are not actually available it is very likely that 
they will try to avoid declaring their unavailability by 
bidding at the price cap and hoping not to be 
dispatched. 
iii. Currently the Penalty value is declared one month 
before the Reliability Year it involves. Even if the new 
proposed methodology is approved, the time horizon 
still seems too short to give the right signals for 
investment.  
These weaknesses can be addressed up to a certain extend 
with the following minor amendments of the CAM rules to 
further increase its efficiency: 
i. The deadline for the participation of the incumbent in 
the RM should be set one week earlier than the other 
participants.  
ii. The SO should perform unscheduled audits to any 
generator suspicious for economic withholding. In case 
a generator declares false availability he should be 
charged with a very high penalty. 
iii. The Penalty calculation methodology should consider a 
longer horizon. Assuming that the Non Compliance 
Penalty Curve methodology is put in place, the 
parameters of the curve should be set three years in 
advance. This will assist the market participants to 
estimate the value of the Penalty for each one of the 
next three years just by forecasting the total available 
capacity of the system for each year. This three-year 
period is considered sufficient for the construction of a 
new CCGT plant. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The Greek Capacity Adequacy Mechanism combines 
elements from various existing capacity mechanisms into a 
new hybrid design. This integration is expected to be 
successful, without giving significant market manipulation 
opportunities to the market participants, while at the same time 
offering higher payments to the generators with higher 
availability, guaranteeing a minimum income to the generators 
and a minimum reliability to the load representatives and 
reducing the volatility of the Contract prices, compared to 
having only a Capacity Market mechanism.  
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